The infrastructures of global connectivity: 5G networks by Alden, Chris & Chan, Kenddrick
 
The Infrastructures of 
Global Connectivity:
5G Networks
CHRIS ALDEN AND KENDDRICK CHAN
CHRIS ALDEN & KENDDRICK CHAN  |  PAGE 2 LSE IDEAS | DIGITAL IR SUBJECT PRIMER  01/2021
The Authors
Professor Chris Alden is Professor of International Relations at LSE and Director 
of LSE IDEAS. He is author/co-author of numerous books, including Foreign 
Policy Analysis—New Approaches 2nd edition (Routledge 2017) and co-editor of 
New Directions in Africa-China Studies (Routledge 2019) and China and Africa—
building peace and security cooperation on the continent (Palgrave 2017).
Kenddrick Chan is an Associate at LSE IDEAS and Project Coordinator of 
the Digital IR project. His research focuses on the intersection of technology 
and international relations. He is also an editor at the Studies in Ethnicity and 
Nationalism journal and a Young Leader with the Pacific Forum.
CHRIS ALDEN & KENDDRICK CHAN  |  PAGE 3 LSE IDEAS | DIGITAL IR SUBJECT PRIMER  01/2021
Executive Summary
The fifth generation of cellular networks (5G) will provide societies with 
much faster connection speeds than existing 3G/4G networks. 5G is also 
expected to enable new forms of interconnectivity such as machine-to-
machine communication, which can then power the Internet of Things 
(IoT), or the transformation of numerous industries, amongst others.
Although the infrastructure of networks has traditionally been divided into 
the “core” and “RAN” (or edge) components, this distinction is increasingly 
blurred in 5G networks with the amalgamation of the core’s functions 
into the RAN. The amount of supporting infrastructure required for the 
rollout of 5G networks will also drastically increase. Additionally, given 
the economic and connectivity benefits that 5G can also offer, numerous 
countries are keen to become early adopters and implementors of 5G 
technology and networks.
All of these concerns have led to a range of policy considerations that 
decision-makers must properly account for. Taking place against the 
backdrop of great power competition, such policy considerations extend 
beyond widely-known concerns of infrastructure integrity and network 
resilience to include questions revolving around global standards-setting 
influence and gaining strategic advantage.
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What is 5G?
The term 5G refers to the fifth 
generation of (technology standards 
for) mobile/cellular networks. This 
new generation of networks will 
have greater bandwidth1, allowing 
for faster download speeds than 
currently possible on existing 3G/4G 
networks. 5G networks will also be 
able to handle a much greater number 
of concurrent connections and allow 
even more devices to be connected. 
5G is therefore poised to usher in a 
new age of connectivity and enable the 
Internet of Things (IoT), where multiple 
devices and appliances (e.g., smart 
fridges, fitness trackers, autonomous 
vehicles) connect to each other to 
communicate and exchange data—
also known as machine-to-machine 
communication. Additionally, the low 
latency (delay time between user input 
and actual action) of 5G networks 
allows for critical machinery to be 
remotely operated with virtually zero 
delays, such as in telesurgery.2 




The Infrastructure of  
5G Networks 
The main components of mobile 
networks are the core network (“core”) 
and the radio access network (“RAN”).3
In simple terms, the core generally 
functions as the physical infrastructure 
where most of the network data is 
stored, routed, and processed from 
a centralized location. In contrast, 
the RAN consists of the cell towers 
and other systems that connect 
end-user and other devices to the 
main core network.
For current 3G/4G mobile networks, 
the core and RAN are often located in 
different geographical locations with a 
few regional core networks supporting 
numerous RAN localities. This is 
done to optimize network coverage 
and performance.
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5G Infrastructure:  
Core vs “Edge”
5G is expected to utilize mobile edge 
computing (“MEC”). MEC refers to 
shifting some of the processing 
and storage of network data away 
from the core and closer to the RAN. 
This reduces the latency (delay time 
between user input and actual action) 
of the network.
However, one implication of this shift is 
the blurring of the distinction between 
the core and RAN. The distinction is 
also further compounded by the fact 
that most network functions no longer 
require physical hardware and can be 
done via software applications instead, 
a concept known as network function 
virtualization, or NFV in short.
All of the above blurs the traditional 
boundaries that previously existed 
within mobile networks. Although there 
still remains a distinction between the 
core and the RAN, the amalgamation 
of some core functions into the 
RAN mean that what was previously 
non-sensitive RAN equipment and 
infrastructure could now affect the 
well-being of the entire network.4 
This changes the network security 
outlook and has resulted in the whole 
“core vs. edge” discussion that is 
currently taking place.
4   https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/5g_edge-core-computing_508_1.pdf
5   https://arxiv.org/pdf/1605.00105.pdf
6   https://www.pwc.com/us/en/industries/tmt/library/5g-small-cell-revolution.html
5G Infrastructure:  
Small Cells
One new technology that 5G networks 
utilize is the ultra-high frequency 
radio wave, also known as millimeter 
wave (or “mmWave”)—referring 
to the high bands (24.25GHz to 
86GHz range) of the radio frequency 
spectrum. This was agreed upon by 
member states of the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) at 
the 2019 World Radiocommunication 
Conference (WRC-19). 
Using mmWaves also allow for 
multi-connectivity, referring to a 
vast number of simultaneous user 
connections (up to 1 million user 
or device connections per square 
mile). However, one drawback is that 
high-frequency waves cannot be 
propagated over large distances and 
are prone to blockage-induced signal 
attenuation (i.e., physical objects such 
as trees, walls, human bodies weaken 
the signal).5 The implication of this is 
that mobile carriers will need hundreds 
or thousands of “small cells” as part 
of their 5G network deployment.6 The 
small cells are capable of handling the 
load requirements of areas with a high 
population density, such as cities or 
sporting arenas and are situated at the 
RAN, or “edge” of the network.
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5G Infrastructure: Data Centers
Another important component of 5G networks are data centers. 
These refer to dedicated facilities or buildings that are dedicated 
to housing the necessary physical infrastructure (i.e., servers, 
routers) that traditionally form the “core” of the network. 
However, the rise of edge computing means that servers are now 
increasingly deployed on the “edge” of the network. Additionally, 
the higher download speed of 5G network also results in 
increased pressure onto data centers to manage the connections 
and process the flow of data traffic that occurs.
All of this is expected to necessitate a change in the network 
architecture (i.e. the way networks are designed). It is expected 
that the data centers  of the 5G era will need to “hyperscale”—
that is the ability to make available computing resources rapidly 
and seamlessly in response to user demand. 5G networks are 
therefore expected to be “open-architecture” networks that 
allow for easy upgrading and swapping of network components.
To-date, key telecommunications companies such as Nokia and 
Huawei have come up with their own open-architecture data 
center infrastructure solutions. 
The drive to standardized data centers and make them 
interoperable and easily scalable has resulted in the formation 
of various groups. These include the O-RAN Alliance, a global 
group of network operators and equipment vendors that seek 
to promote open and fully-interoperable mobile networks, or the 
Open Compute Project (OCP), an organization that aims to bring 
together top technology companies (such as Facebook, IBM, 
Dell, Cisco, and Nokia) to share data center product designs and 
best practices.
Therefore, 5G networks require a sizeable amount of 
infrastructure to be constructed—which inadvertently carries 
with it political implications.
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Key policy considerations of 5G networks  
for policy-makers
Given the wide-ranging economic 
and connectivity benefits that 5G 
can offer, numerous countries are 
thus keen to become early leaders, in 
either 5G technology development or 
implementation and adoption. These 
include the United States, China, the 
United Kingdom,7 and Singapore,8 
to name a few. Failing to secure a “first-
mover advantage” could have strategic 
implications for countries. For example, 
the United States has recognized that 
failing to promote a speedy rollout for 
the 2G and 3G generations during the 
2000s had economic (and security) 
implications for the country—with 
numerous  wireless technology 
companies ceasing operations or 
being acquired during this period.9 
This phenomenon was similarly 
replicated during the 4G era with first 
movers capturing virtually all of the 
4G ecosystem.10 This meant that 













network equipment manufacturers 
being supplanted in the market, despite 
having dominated the earlier 3G era.11 
Given the implications 5G adoption 
has for a country’s economic and 
technological competitiveness, it is 
therefore unsurprising that countries 
have placed strategic importance 
on the speedy adoption and rollout 
of 5G networks.
However, the adoption of 5G may also 
open up a new set of vulnerabilities 
for states. The blurring of traditional 
boundaries between the “edge” and the 
“core” (as mentioned earlier) means 
that attacks on non-sensitive “edge” 
equipment and infrastructure could 
now pose a much bigger threat to the 
entire network.
Key security concerns regarding 
5G networks involve operational 
processes (i.e., monitoring and 
responding to breaches), network 
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deployment (i.e., designing secure and 
resilient networks), vendor product 
development (i.e., ensuring version 
control and secure software updates), 
and standardization (i.e., protocols, 
algorithms).12 As all these components 
and processes are interrelated, 
unaddressed vulnerabilities in one 
component may end up compromising 
the integrity of the entire “supply chain”. 
The recognition of such “supply chain 
risks” and the threat they pose has 
also led to countries like the United 
States launching initiatives to prevent 
or mitigate them.13 In short, due to the 
emergence of new threat vectors and 
resulting vulnerabilities that accompany 
5G networks, a new dimension in the 
security landscape for countries has 
also surfaced. The risks associated 
with 5G networks and their deployment 
are now also national security risks—a 
view echoed by both government 
officials and industry experts.14
In this regard, ongoing debate and 
concerns around 5G can be classified 
into two broad categories. The first 
category generally revolves around 









the extent to which foreign suppliers of 
5G telecommunications infrastructure 
can be trusted. The second, and often 
overlooked, category revolves around 
themes pertaining to the adoption, 
deployment and regulation of 5G 




As previously discussed, 5G networks 
require a large amount of supporting 
network infrastructure. The capacity 
to construct and deploy such 
infrastructure in an efficient and cost-
effective manner is largely limited to 
key players in the market. Some of 
these include Qualcomm (US), Huawei 
(China), Ericsson (Sweden), and 
Nokia (Finland). 
Given the ongoing competition 
between the US and China, it is 
therefore unsurprising that Chinese 
technology companies have come 
under increasing scrutiny. Huawei, the 
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equipment in the world, has attracted 
the ire of both US and UK policymakers 
over allegations that it is linked to the 
Chinese Communist Party15 and could 
be compelled to act on behalf of the 
Chinese government—allegations that 
Huawei actively denies. Pointing out 
(1) the PRC’s recent enactment of the 
National Intelligence Law, which states 
that “all Chinese citizens and companies 
have a legal obligation to support, assist, 
and cooperate in national intelligence 
work”16 and (2) that equipment and 
infrastructure produced by Huawei’s 
have contained ‘backdoors’ which allow 
it to covertly access network data17 
which can then be transferred to the 
Chinese government, US policymakers 
have claimed that allowing Huawei to 
be a part of its 5G telecommunications 
network would be akin to placing its 
national security at the hands what 
essentially amounts to a foreign state. A 
notable example is that of the CryptoAG 
company, whose joint ownership by the 
America and West German intelligence 
services during the Cold War was kept 
secret until recently. The company, 
which specialized in manufacturing 
encrypted communication devices, had 
wittingly sold compromised devices to 
its customers (who included Iran and 
15  https://www.cnbc.com/2020/10/08/huawei-accused-of-collusion-with-china-commu  
 nist-party-uk-lawmakers.html
16  http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c30834/201806/483221713dac4f31bda7f9d951108912.shtml




various military regimes in Latin America, 
amongst others). This allowed American, 
British, and German intelligence services 
to spy upon foreign governments.18
However, the debate over infrastructure 
integrity and 5G is not merely 
limited to Chinese telecommunications 
companies. The debate also reflects 
concerns of governments about being 
over-reliant on any single equipment 
vendor. The United Kingdom for 
example, found that its removal of 
Huawei as an equipment vendor for its 
5G network resulted in the UK having 
greater reliance on other equipment 
vendors, such as Nokia or Ericsson. This 
is, according to the British government, 
“an unsatisfactory position” with regards 
to the overall resilience of the UK’s 5G 
telecommunications infrastructure.19 
As stated earlier, equipment vendors 
play a role in delivering secure software 
updates and ensuring keeping their 
telecommunications equipment 
secure. Given the role that equipment 
vendors play in ensuring the integrity 
of the network, it is unsurprising to 
see governments taking an interest 
in avoiding overreliance on a single 
vendor—as seen in the UK’s case.
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Policy Considerations:  
Rapid 5G adoption for strategic advantage
Given the strategic benefits that being a “first-mover” in the 5G ecosystem can 
yield, numerous countries have already launched initiatives with regards to the 
adoption of 5G. For example, the US’s Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) has launched an extensive strategy to “Facilitate America’s Superiority in 5G 
Technology” (known as the 5G FAST Plan), which calls for modernizing outdated 
rules and regulations to streamline 5G infrastructure deployment and making funds 
available for provisioning 5G services in rural parts of the countries, amongst other 
actions.20 The strategic importance of 5G adoption has also been seen through 
various directives that the Chinese government have initiated. For example, the 
Chinese Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) has laid out the 5G 
+ Industrial Internet 512 Project Promotion Plan, signaling its intent to go beyond 
the rollout of 5G networks to develop a 5G-based “industrial internet”. Specifically, 
the ministry seeks to develop at least 20 replicable industrial application scenarios 
as part of efforts to utilize 5G to transform its domestic industries. Amongst other 
things, the plan also calls for promoting alliances between industry companies, 
research centers, and universities to carry out joint research.21
20  https://www.fcc.gov/5G
21  http://www.cac.gov.cn/2019-11/24/c_1576133540276534.htm
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Policy Considerations:  
Standards Setting in International Organizations
Standard-setting also looks to be key 
concern for policymakers in the 5G 
era. Put simply, standards serve as 
the basic building block for ensuring 
product interoperability and are the 
basis for the smooth introduction 
of new technologies and products 
to the market.22 Although American 
and European technology firms 
(i.e., Qualcomm and Ericsson) have 
traditionally dominated standards 
setting in the telecommunications 
industry, increasing Chinese activity 
in that regard signals the possibility 
that this will be a heavily-contested 
era in the years to come. For example, 
Chinese telecommunications firms 
submitted the most technical 
documents pertaining to wired 
communications standards to 
the International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU) in 2019. A total of 830 
documents were submitted, making 
China the country with the highest 
number of submissions. It also meant 
that China had submitted more than 
three times the number of documents 
submitted by the second, third and 





Closely related to standard-setting in 
international organizations such as 
the ITU are the assorted conferences 
that are attended by both country and 
industry representatives. For instance, 
the ITU World Radiocommunication 
Conference 2019 (WRC-19) was 
attended by delegates from most of 
the ITU’s 193 member states, together 
with officials from other international 
organizations, or representatives from 
the industry.23 It is at international (and 
regional) conferences like these that 
countries compete to ensure that the 
final consensus reflects their interests. 
For example, WRC-19 conference 
documents show that the US has 
actively sought to make its concerns 
known over the issue of 5G wireless 
spectrum allocation—termed the “most 
prominent” issue in the conference’s 
agenda.24 Given the importance of 
standards setting and the role that 
organizations like the ITU play, it can 
be expected standards setting will now 
increasingly reflect the wider political 
competition taking place in the era 
of 5G networks. 
The Digital IR project at LSE IDEAS seeks to understand 
the interplay between technological changes and 
international political developments to allow us to 
better grasp how the international system is being 
impacted now and what the future holds as the 
information age matures.
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